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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action by Plaintiff to collect on a 
promissory note with a Counterclaim by Defendant to 
obtain a refund of her down payment on the purchase of a 
condominium and damages for wrongful attachment. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried before the Court. From a 
decision and judgment granting the claim of Plaintiff and 
a portion of Defendant's Counterclaim, Plaintiff appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of that part of the judgment 
granting Defendant return of her down payment and, that 
failing, of the Court's refusal to allow offsets against 
any judgment awarded to Defendant, as a matter of law, or 
-
that failing, a new trial. 
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STATEMEHT OF FACTS 
Synopsis 
During the middle of January, 1975, Defendant, 
a single, divorced woman with minor children, visited 
some condominiums owned by Plaintiff and decided to 
purchase one of them. (R. 127) . Defendant tried to obtain 
a loan in order to finance the purchase, but was turned 
down by Zions Bank because her debt-income ratio was too 
high. After discussing the matter with the Real Estate 
broker handling the condominium sales and with an agent 
for Plaintiff, Defendant decided she still wanted to purchase 
the unit and could make sufficient changes in her debt-
income situation in order to qualify for financing at a 
later date. (R. 137). On March 18, 1975, Defendant entered 
in an 18 month Uniform Real Estate Contract with Plaintiff, 
which enabled her to move into the unit immediately while 
continuing to look for conventional financing. After making 
some positive changes in her income situation, Defendant, 
at the instance of Plaintiff, applied a second time to 
Zions Bank for financing. This time the application was 
approved by the bank, but was turned down by the mortgage 
insurance company, apparently by mistake. Because of 
Defendant's impending marital plans, the bank refused to 
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resubmit the application, and Defendant moved out of her 
unit after negotiations with Plaintiff failed. Plaintiff sued 
for return of some money loaned to Defendant, and Defendant 
counterclaimed for the return of her down payment. The main 
question before the Court is whether the Earnest Money 
Agreement submitted by Defendant at the time of the second 
loan application constituted a new agreement between the 
parties, replacing and cancelling the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract previously entered into on March 18. 
Statement of Facts 
The condominium unit purchased by the Defendant was 
part of a small complex owned by the Plaintiff known as 
Country Hills Square located at 1150 Country Hills Drive, 
Ogden, Utah. The units were being sold by the real estate 
brokerage, Real Estate Exchange, and the name of the salesman 
involved in the sale to the Defendant was Gary Iverson. 
Mr. Iverson helped to prepare the first Earnest Money Agreement 
and to explain it to the Defendant. (R. 114). The initial 
application to Zions First National Bank was turned down, 
however, for the reason that Defendant's debt-income ratio 
was too high. (R. 82, R. 111, R. 115, R. 129). Because 
Defendant appeared to be serious in her desire to purchase 
the unit and because it appeared Defendant would very likely 
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qualify for financing after some adjustments in her financial 
situation, Plaintiff offered to sell Defendant the condominim 
on an 18 month contract, thereby permitting her to move into 
the unit immediately and reapply for financing at a more 
favorable moment. (R. 109, R. 115-116). 
The Uniform Real Estate Contract was signed by 
the Defendant and by Mr. Dennis G. Lawrence, a representative 
of the Plaintiff. The terms of the contract were that the 
Defendant would pay $2,350.00 down and would make $240.00 
monthly payments of interest, taxes and maintenance until 
the remaining balance was paid on or before September 1, 1976. 
(P.Ex: A). Defendant read the contract over and has stated 
that the terms and conditions were clear and understandable 
to her. (R. 118, R. 137-138). Shortly after the contract 
was signed, the Defendant moved into the unit after the 
downpayment had been used to prepare the unit to her liking, 
including the remodeling of the utility room and the instal-
lation of a 14.5 cubic foot refrigerator. (P.Ex.B, R. 107). 
After moving in, Defendant proceeded to reduce 
her debt burden and increase her income. With the assistance 
of Mr. Iverson, she obtained a loan to pay off various credito 
and to consolidate her obligations into one monthly payment 
to the bank. (R. 147-148, R. 117, R. 137). She also found 
-4-
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a higher paying second job, which, in addition to several 
pay raises in her main job, to the income from the renters 
of a house she owned and to her monthly child support and 
alimony payments, decreased her debt-income ratio. 
R. 122, R. 138). 
(R. 118, 
In late July, 1975, the Defendant was approached 
by Mr. Lawrence who informed her that the low-interest 
federal monies which she had previously applied for were 
being withdrawn from the market on August 31. He suggested 
she apply for them again before their withdrawal. (R. 83). 
Although he had not been involved in her previous loan 
application, he indicated that he had made an analysis of 
her loan qualifications and was convinced that she would 
now qualify. (R. 111, R. 139). Defendant thereupon decided 
to reapply for financing through Zions Bank. The bank indicated, 
however, that it would be necessary to submit a new Earnest 
Money Agreement, since the federal monies were available 
only toward the purchase of new homes. (R. 83-84). According 
to Plaintiff, the bank was aware of the previous loan applica-
tion and of the March 18 contract, but had decided that the 
purchase was recent enough to make it acceptable under the 
circumstances. (R. 100, R. 105). 
Wishing to point out to reviewing authorities that 
the Defendant was already living in the unit, but believing 
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that a lease arrangement would be looked on mote favorably 
than a short term contract specially designed to accommodate 
conventional financing, Plaintiff and Defendant indicated in 
the new commercial form Earnest Money Agreement, filled out 
by Mr. Lawrence and dated July 31, 1975, that the previous 
living arrangement had been a lease. (R. 85, R. 100, P.Ex.B), 
The agreement gave Defendant credit for her original down 
payment of $2,250.00 by calling it an advance on lease. 
(P.Ex.B). As is customarily the case with an Earnest Money 
Agreement, a provision was added that the sale would be 
subject to Defendant's obtaining financing for the purchase 
price, which was to have been accomplished by August 15, 1975. 
No discussion was had between Plaintiff and Defendant with 
regard to the Earnest Money Agreement replacing the March 
18 contract, and Defendant understood that the purpose of 
the new agreement was to enable the loan application 
to be processed. (R 102, R. 140). Defendant stated in trial 
that she understood another pu~pose of the Earnest Money 
Agreement was to cross out the previous contract (R. 140), 
but Mr. Lawrence testified that such was definitely not the 
expressed intentions of the parties and certainly not 
Plaintiff's intention. (R. 100-102). In order to assist 
Defendant to meet closing costs, Plaintiff loaned Defendant 
$1,000.00, which was to be returned if financial negotiations 
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failed. (R. 25, R. 88, R. 141, P.Ex.C). Defendant continued 
to make her usual $240.00 monthly payments. (R. 101). 
This 3econd time around, Zions Bank approved the 
loan application and then submitted it to Mortgage Guarantee 
Insurance Corporation for its approval. (R. 85-86). On 
or about September 15, 1975, Zions Bank informed Mr. Lawrence 
that the loan application had been denied by MGIC on the 
grounds that there was not sufficient square-footage in 
the unit to accommodate the number of persons living there. 
(R. 86). Upon investigation, Mr. Lawrence discovered that 
a mistake in floor space had been made in the appraisal 
submitted to MGIC by the bank. (R. 86, R. 110). Zions 
Bank agreed to resubmit the loan application with the correct 
square-footage. (R. 86, R. 193). 
On or about the same date, Mr. Lawrence contacted 
the Defendant and explained to her what had happened. (R. 86, 
R. 142-143). She consented to the resubmission of the loan 
application, but asked if the application could be hastened, 
since she was planning to marry within 10 days. (R. 87, 
R. 143, R. 193). Thinking that perhaps the intended husband's 
credit could lend support to Defendant's application, 
Mr. Lawrence asked the Defendant the condition of her 
intended husband's finances. She indicated that he had just 
been through bankruptcy. (R. 87, R. 143, R. 147). It being 
-7-
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obvious that marriage would not improve the status of 
her application, Mr. Lawrence asked the Defendant if she 
would be willing to postpone her marriage until a later 
date. (R. 87, R. 147). She indicated that she would not. 
(R. 87). Mr. Lawrence then went to Zions Bank, explained 
Defendant's marriage plans and asked if the bank would 
be in a position to obtain loan approval prior to her marriag< 
Since Defendant had applied as a single woman and since the 
loan would not have actually come through until after she 
would have been married according to her announced plans, 
Zions Bank decided not to resubmit the application representir 
Defendant as a single woman. (R. 87, R. 193). Defendant 
testified that she also tried to obtain financing by herself 
at Bank of Utah where she had her checking and savings 
accounts. (R. 148, R. 152). 
Although Defendant testified in Court that she reaU 
never got married (R. 144), on or about October 16, Mr.Lawrenc 
stated he met in Defendant's unit with Defendant and a man 
Defendant introduced as her husband to discuss Defendant's 
intentions with regard to future financing. (R. 90, R. 148, 
R. 194). The Defendant and her companion asked if certain 
provisions of the March 18 contract could be changed. 
They wanted unlimited time in which to find financing and 
wanted portions of the monthly payments to be applied to 
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principal. R. 90-91). Mr. Lawrence indicated that he could 
not give them unlimited time in which to find financing, but 
would continue to assist them in their search. (R. 108 I 
R. 90). Mr. Lawrence offered Defendant a $1,000.00 discount 
on the old contract and agreed to carry a new 18 month 
contract on a principal-plus-interest basis with $271.12 
monthly payments. (R. 91-92, R. 148, D.Ex.14). Defendant's 
purported husband refused Mr. Lawrence's offer and, upon 
request, refused to return the $1,000.00 loaned to Defendant 
for closing costs. (R. 92, R. 186). On October 31, therefore, 
Mr. Lawrence wrote Defendant a letter requesting she return 
the $1,000.00 loaned to her, since the August application 
had not been successful. (D.Ex.13). 
On or about November 26, 1975, Plaintiff received 
a letter from the Defendant enclosing her payment for 
November and indicating that she would make another monthly 
payment upon receipt of certain checks which she had previously 
sent the Plaintiff. (P.Ex.D). She also indicated she was 
going to see an attorney. At that time, Defendant had made 
six monthly payments, paying her through the month of October. 
(R. 97). On or about December 8, 1975, Defendant moved out 
of her condominium unit, taking the refrigerator with her, 
and has made no further payments to the Plaintiff. (R. 134, 
R. 185, R. 188, R. 200). On or about December 19, 1977, 
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Defendant's attorney sent a letter to Plaintiff informing 
Plaintiff that Defendant was rejecting and rescinding the 
March 18 contract. (R. 192). 
On January 21, 1976, Plaintiff filed an action to 
recover on the promissory note. (R. 1). Contemparaneous 
therewith, Plaintiff sued out a Writ of Attachment, without 
notice, against Defendant's automobile and bank accounts, 
believing the Defendant to be concealing her assets. (R. 12) 
The Writ was subsequently quashed on the grounds that the 
act of the Clerk of Court issuing the Writ without prior 
review of a Judge violated the due process clause of the 
Constitution of the United States. (R. 209, R. 10). Upon 
trial, the Court awarded damages for wrongful attachment 
and found that the July 31 Earnest Money Agreement constitu-
ted a new contract between the parties, replacing the March 
18 Uniform Real Estate Contract. The Court also ruled 
that the down payment under the March contract should be 
returned to Defendant, after deducting the amount of the 
$1,000.00 promissory note. (R. 29-30). Plaintiff moved the 
Court for a new trial or, in the alternative, to amend the 
judgment,but Plaintiff's motion was denied. (R. 61). 
-10-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE 
JULY 31, 1975 EARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT 
WAS A NEW CONTRACT SUPPLANTING THE 
MARCH 18, 1975 UNIFORM REAL ESTATE 
CONTRACT. 
The law generally states that a final expression 
of agreement, whether it is written or oral, prevails over 
a prior expression if the parties so intend. When the 
parties to an agreement reduce it to writing, with the 
intention that such writing be a final statement of their 
agreement, the agreement is said to be integrated. The 
critical question, then, is one of the intention of the 
parties. While some older cases have held that the question 
of integration is to be determined solely from the face of 
the writing and that the only question for the court is 
whether the writing appears to be a complete agreement, 
there is little question that the appearance test is insuf-
ficient today and should be rejected by the Courts. Murray 
on Contracts, Sec. 106, 2nd Rev. Ed (1974). To follow the 
appearance test would, as Murray and Corbin have indicated 
in their treatises on contracts, often overlook the actual, 
express intentions of the parties and create a fictitious 
intention which may or may not coincide with the actual 
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intention of the parties. Murray on Contracts, Sec. 196, 
2nd Rev. Ed. (1974). Wigmore, in his treatise on evidence 
asserts that the intention of the parties controls and that 
such intention must be found in the language and conduct of 
the parties as well as in the surrounding circumstances. 
9 J. Wigmore, Evidence Sec. 2413, 2430, 2431 (3d Ed 1940); 
Murray on Contracts, Sec. 106, 2nd Rev. Ed. (1974). 
The Restatement of Contracts states that a writing 
cannot, of itself, prove its own completeness and that 
wide latitude must be allowed for inquiry into circumstances 
bearing on the intention of the parties. Restatement, 2d 
Sec. 236, Comment b (1973). Murray on Contracts, Sec. 197, 
2nd Rev. Ed. (1974). When the principal purpose of the 
parties is ascertained, after reviewing all available 
evidence, further interpretation of an agreement is guided 
by such purpose. Murray on Contracts, Sec. 114, 2nd Rev. 
Ed. (1974); Restatement 2nd Sec. 228(1) (1973). 
The Utah Courts have generally followed the course 
of interpretation outlined above. In the case of Bullfrog 
Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 501 P. 2d (1972), the Court on Page 27( 
stated that when parties have reduced to writing what appears 
to be a complete and certain agreement, it will be conclusive! 
presumed, in the absence of fraud, that the writing contains 
the whole of the agreement between the parties. On the other 
-12-
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hand, the Court indicated that such principle was only 
correct when applied to an integrated contract. In order 
to determine the issue of integration, extrinsic evidence 
was admissible to show the circumstances under which the 
agreement was made and the underlying purpose for which 
the instrument was executed. The Court went on to state that 
when considering such extrinsic evidence, the interpretation 
given by the parties, themselves, as shown by their acts 
would be adopted by the Court. The Court reasoned that 
such actions would be persuasive evidence of what the true 
intentions of the parties were, even if such actions were 
quite different from the contract itself, and would, also, 
constitute the necessary ambiguity to permit examination of 
extrinsic evidence of intent. The Bullfrog Marina ruling 
and reasoning was strongly supported by the 1975 Utah case 
of zeese v. Estate of Seigel, 534 P. 2d. 85 and also by the 
case of Bullough v. Sims, 400 P. 2d. 20, 16 u.2d. 304 (1965). 
In the present case, it seems obvious to Plaintiff 
that the parties never intended that the July Earnest Money 
Agreement abrogate the March contract. First of all, at 
the time of the signing of the July Earnest Money Agreement 
no discussion whatsoever took place about the March contract. 
Mr. Lawrence explained to Defendant the purpose of the 
-13-
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agreement, which was to enable the loan to be processed, 
and Defendant signed it. 
No discussion about replacing the March contract 
occurred after the signing, either. In fact, the first 
mention of such a possibility appeared in Defendant's 
Answer and Counterclaim, dated February 17, 1976, even though 
Defendant's attorney had previously sent Plaintiff a letter 
announcing and explaining Defendant's intention to rescind 
on December 19, 1975. Had Defendant already considered the 
contract to have been replaced, why didn't she mention the 
replacement issue until February? Since the defense of 
c/1~f1ncf 
rescision is d-M;.t~from the claim that a contract has been 
replaced, why did Defendant announce in December, through 
her attorney, that she was rescinding the March contract? 
Furthermore, Defendant continued to make her 
$240.00 monthly payments, as outlined in the March contract, 
through October, 1975. She even stated in a letter to 
Plaintiff dated November 28, that she would be making her 
November payment shortly. Since no mention of monthly 
payments was made in the Earnest Money Agreement, she must 
have been operating under some other agreement. The only 
other agreement, oral or written, between the parties was the 
March contract. 
-14-
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Finally, if Defendant truly believed that the 
March Contract had been replaced, then why did she and her 
purported husband sit down with Mr. Lawrence on or about 
October 16 and discuss modifications to the contract? 
Why did they not state at the time that the March contract 
was no longer in effect and demand the returri of the Earnest 
Money? Instead, they discussed lengthening the period of 
the contract, allowing a portion of the payments to be 
allocated to principal and decreasing the amount of the 
monthly payments. No mention was made of the Earnest 
Money Agreement. Their attempts to modify the March Contract, 
therefore, had the legal effect of reaffirming the ongoing 
validity of such contract. 
-15-
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POINT TWO 
EVEN ASSUMING THE EARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT FRAMED 
A NEW AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES, SUBSEQUENT 
ACTS ON THE PART OF DEFENDANT EFFECTED A 
RATIFICATION OR REINSTATEMENT OF THE MARCH 
CONTRACT. 
Ratification is based upon the intentional relinquish-
ment of a known right. Michel v. ICN Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
549 P.2d 519 (Or. 1976). Accordingly, one would be 
considered to have ratified a contract if he continued to per· 
form under its provisions, even though he knew for one reason 
or another, that he didn't have to and could avoid it. 
In the present case, had it been Defendant's under-
standing and intent that the July Earnest Money Agreement 
replaced the March contract, then she would not have had to 
make any further payments under the March contract nor would 
she have had to be further involved with the Contract in the 
case that financing didn't come through. She could have 
immediately requested return of the Earnest Money-do~m 
payment and moved out of the unit. Instead, Defendant con-
tinued making her usual monthly payments under the March 
contract and, upon denial of the loan application, met with 
Plaintiff to discuss modification to the Contract so that she 
could continue her purchase. In so doing, Defendant waived 
whatever rights she had to avoid the March contract and, in 
effect, ratified it. 
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Even if the parties had initially intended that the 
Earnest Money Agreement integrate their intentions, they, in 
effect, mutually abandoned the agreement by offering and 
receiving monthly payments under the former contract, by 
sitting down to negotiate a modification of terms of the for-
mer contract and by Defendant's later delcaring her intention· 
to rescind the Contract. Pitcher v. Lauritzen, 18 Utah 2d 
368, 423 P.2d 491 11967). 
As did the Plaintiff in the Utah case of Dayton v. 
Gibbons & Reed Company, Defendant, in effect, adopted the 
March contract by continuing in the performance thereof, 
even though she could have, by law, avoided it. Dayton v. 
Gibbons & Reed Company, 12 Utah 2d 296, 365 P.2d 801 (1961). 
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POINT THREE 
EVEN IF THE EARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT 
REPLACED THE CONTRACT, DEFENDANT WAS 
NOT ENTITLED TO RETURN OF THE EARNEST 
MONEY. 
The Earnest Money Agreement, once signed by the 
parties, obligated them to the performance of certain 
duties; Plaintiff to have the home ready and title 
clear for transfer and Defendant to secure proper financing. 
Although not expressly stated within the Agreement, Defendant 
had a duty to attempt the acquisition of financing in GOOD 
FAITH. This implied good faith endeavor on a purchaser's 
part goes to the very crux of an Earnest Money Agreement, and 
absent it, there is at best an illusory contract which binds 
no party. 
The record clearly indicates that Zion's Bank 
stood ready to approve the necessary financing until the 
statement by Defendant that she intended to enter the holy 
state of matrimony in a scant half-score days. 
Testimony by Defendant at trial declared that she 
had not in fact married. The Defendant's male companion was, 
however, subsequent to the notification of intended marriage, 
introduced to Plaintiff as her spouse. Did Defendant use 
her supposed marriage as a means of insuring the defeat of 
her loan application? If Defendant's actions were calculated 
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to prevent financing and avoid the contract, then her 
financing attempts were not made in good faith. The 
ramifications of this situation are numerous. A bad faith 
effort by Defendant does not release her from the Earnest 
Money Agreement and she is still bound by the Agreement and 
liable for the whole purchase price. At the very least, 
Defendant is not entitled to a return of the $2,250.00 
paid as Earnest Money. 
Admittedly, Earnest Money generally is and should be, 
refunded when the purchase fails. However, there are exceptions: 
" bad faith by the purchaser or some 
act intended to cause a refusal to approve 
the requested loan." 
Wineman v. Guilmett, 60 Wash 2d 831, 367 P.2d 534, 535 (1962); 
also: 
"A purchaser who has made a deposit ordinarily 
is entitled to recover Earnest Money still 
in the possession of the broker, if the 
sale has failed through no fault of such 
purchaser . . but he is not entitled 
to recover where his own fault prevents 
the sale." 
Medak v. DePrez, 236 Or. 31, 386 P.2d 805, 807 (1963). 
Defendant's declaration of marriage intent was the 
sole cause for the failure of the loan application. If it was 
made in bad faith, or if her actions were unreasonable under 
the circumstances, she alone should bear the resulting burden. 
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POINT FOUR 
EVEN WERE DEFENDANT ENTITLED TO A REFUND 
OF THE EARNEST MONEY, PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE 
ALLOWED OFFSETS AGAINST IT. 
The evidence has established that Plaintiff 
prepared the condominium in question for Defendant's 
occupation thereof. To this end, the utility room was 
remodeled,arefrigerator was secured, and other necessary 
improvements were furnished. The sums expended by Plaintiff 
in preparation of the unit for Defendant were $1,823.55. 
Defendant also owed Plaintiff $1,000 on a promissor 
note which the Court found to be due and owing the Plaintiff. 
Under the March 18, 1975 Uniform Real Estate 
Contract, Defendant was to make monthly payments in the 
amount of $240.00 each, starting May 1, 1975. At the time 
of Defendant's moving out of Unit #308 on or about December 
1975, without notice to Plaintiff, Defendant was in arrears 
as to rent in the amount of $304.00 plus $120.00 for failure 
to give two weeks notice of intent to vacate. 
Even if the rental arrangement were not binding as 
to the amount due, nevertheless, a "reasonable rental" would 
be chargeable. 
" • the purchaser upon his rescission of the 
contract must also put the seller in the position 
he was in at the time of the execution of the 
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contract. Thus, the purchaser would be 
chargeable with the reasonable rental 
value of the land during the time he held 
possession plus interest thereon. Tilbury 
v. Osmundson (1960) 143 Colo. 12, 352 P.2d 
102; Kunde v. O'Brian (1932) 214 Iowa 921, 
243 N.W. 594; Leavitt v. Blohm (1960) 11 
Utah 2d 220, 347 P.2d 190." 
Williams v. Dunas, 40 Ill. App. 3d 782, 352 N.E. 2d 266, 
269 (1976). 
Plaintiff should be allowed to offset the $2,500.00 
Earnest Money deposit with the $1,000 promissory note, the 
value of the refrigerator ($247.21) taken by Defendant from 
the premises, the unpaid rent $424.00, and the sums expended 
by Plaintiff in preparing the condominium to suit Defendant's 
needs $1,576.34. 
In a case wherein the recovery of Earnest Money 
was allowed a prospective purchaser (the Plaintiff of that 
action), the Court stated concerning the rights of Defendant 
seller: 
"A second question involves defendant's right 
to recover for expenditures incurred in altering 
the house for the plaintiffs in anticipation 
of plaintiffs' performance of the contract. 
With respect to this right, ample authority 
exists supporting the proposition that under 
proper circumstances a vendor or lessor may 
recover for work and material expended on his 
own property in reliance on a void or unenforce-
able contract for its sale or rental. The basis 
for the recovery is the prospective vendee's 
request that the property be suited to his 
needs. Although the vendees here received no 
benefit from the expenditure and are relieved 
from performance of the contract, they are not 
relieved of their promise, which the law implies, 
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to reimburse defendant for the expenditures 
made in preparing the property for plaintiffs' 
use. The benefit to defendant's property, 
if any, is properly a matter in reduction 
of damages .... In addition to the expense 
of changing the house to suit the plaintiff's 
tastes, defendant allowed plaintiffs nearly 
four months' rent-free use of the house. The 
trial court correctly included in its 
$2,000 award a reasonable rental value for 
that period of time." 
Abrams v. Financial Service Co., 13 U2d 343, 374 P.2d 309. 
311 (1962). 
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CONCLUSION 
The evidence and law both support Plaintiff's 
contention that the March Real Estate Contract was 
never replaced by the July Earnest Money Agreement. The 
judgment in favor of Defendant should be set aside, 
therefore, with direction that Plaintiff not be 
required to return Defendant's down payment. Alternatively, 
assuming a finding that the Earnest Money Agreement replaced 
the March contract, Plaintiff should not have to return 
the down payment either because Defendant bargained 
in bad faith or because there were sufficient offsets 
against it. Finally, in the alternative, the judgment 
should be reversed and remanded for a new trial. 
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